Sunday, January 24, 2016

What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat

_What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat_ by Louise Richardson NY: Random House, 2006 ISBN 1-4000-6481-3
(xii) ...I am struck by how futile counterterrorist policies are likely to be when they are based on a view of terrorists as one-dimensional evildoers and psychopaths.
Another good book on understanding terroristic motives is _Terror in the Name of God_. Oddly enough, both are written by women who teach at Harvard and have been studying terrorism since before 9/11. Too bad "real men" don't listen to women and laugh at Harvard intellectuals.

(xiii) My view of the world [having grown up in Ireland], in other words, is very different from that of my American children, who have learned to assume that the majority is right and that, as demonstrated by the War of Independence, the Civil War, and the world wars, the good guys win the wars.

(xix) I have emerged from my academic shell, therefore, to argue in this book that we cannot defeat terrorism by smashing every terrorist movement, an effort to do so will only generate more terrorists as has happened repeatedly in the past. We should never have declared a global war on terrorism, knowing that such a war can never be won. We should never have believed that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hyssein were working together against us. Our objective should not be the completely unattainable goal of obliterating terrorism; rather, we should pursue the more modest and attainable goal of containing terrorist recruitment and constraining resort to the tactic of terrorism.

(xxi) Al-Qaeda spokesman: Al-Qa'ida can take over the enemy's means and use them against him, while the enemy cannot do the same. The mujahedeen can do this because they have come to understand the enemy's mentality and how his society functions; yet the enemy has no way of deterring the believer or influencing his mentality.

(xxii) When terrorists act, they are seeking three immediate objectives: they want to exact revenge, to acquire glory, and to force their adversary into a reaction. There are the three R's of revenge, renown, and reaction.

(6) The final and most important defining characteristic of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of civilians... They insist that those who pay taxes to a government are responsible for their actions whether they are Russians or Americans... Terrorists, by contrast, rarely have illusions about their ability to inflict military defeat on the enemy. Rather, they seek either to cause the enemy to overreact and thereby permit them to recruit large numbers of followers to that they can launch a guerrilla campaign, or to have such a psychological or economic impact on the enemy that it will withdraw of its own accord. Bin Laden called this the "bleed-until-bankruptcy plan."
NB: Sorta kinda like the "slow bleed" strategy the Republicans like to say the Democrats are for. Another example of great minds thinking alike?
(9) Unless and until we are willing to label a group whose ends we believe to just a terrorist group, if it deliberately targets civilians in order to achieve those ends, we are never going to be able to forge effective international cooperation against terrorism.

(16) The second common claim [of terrorists] is that no other strategy is available.

(24) As today's terrorists have learned, random violence has a much bigger impact than discriminate violence, because if nobody is selected then nobody is safe.

(25) The extraordinary brutality of the Sicarii/Zealots can be attributed in part to their religious conviction but also to the fact that there were several different groups of Zealots and Sicarii operating simultaneously in pursuit of the same ends. These groups competed with one another to demonstrate the superiority of their commitment and to claim leadership of the movement. This same dynamic of intraterrorist competition has continued to fuel terrorist violence and is particularly evident today among Palestinian groups.

(35) Far from being isolated from those around them, Lenin's cadre of revolutionaries exploited popular grievances as a means of consolidating their support. It did not matter to Lenin that the complaints might be from nationalists, aspiring landowners, or others unsympathetic to his cause. What did matter to the ultimate pragmatist was that animosity toward the authorities made them potentially sympathetic to subversives, whose political powerlessness left them free to make empty promises. Lenin's key contribution to terrorist strategy, therefore, was the importance of exploiting every fragment of local alienation for its own ends. It is very clear from reading bin Laden's public statements that he has taken this lesson to heart. He criticizes the United States for everything from support for Israel to the deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia to its refusal to sign on to the international criminal court to profiteering by the Halliburton Company.

(36-37) The point here is that the greater brutality of terrorists reflects a greater brutality in political life generally. The nineteenth-century terrorists were more restrained and more discriminating than their twentieth-century successors. Their abandonment of the combatant/noncombatant distinction, however, occurred after the distinction had been profoundly challenged by the conduct of states during the world wars.

(40) Rove told the New York Conservative Party, "Conservatives saw what happened to us on 9/11 and said: we sill defeat our enemies. Liberals saw what happened to us and said: we must understand our enemies." The public's desire to understand - which does not mean to sympathize or empathize with - the causes of the terrible violence wreaked upon us constitutes one of the strongest elements in the American counterterrorist arsenal.

(44-45) The sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer asked Dr Abdul Aziz Rantisi, one of the founders of Hamas (assassinated by Israel in April 2004), in what way he thought Hamas was misunderstood. He said, "You think we are the aggressors. That is the number one misunderstanding. We are not: we are the victims." Bin Laden, characteristically, phrase it more dramatically: " The truth is the whole Muslim world is the victim of international terrorism, engineered by America and the United Nations."

(46) One Italian activist put it this way; "We shared the idea that the armed struggle, besides its historical necessity, was also an occasion to build human relations which had to be, I don't know how to say, absolute, based on the readiness to die, the opposite of everyday life, of the individualization of a capitalist society."
NB: living an authentic life
(56) What appears to drive some people to violence is not their absolute levels of poverty but rather their position relative to others... Previously one compared oneself to others nearby, but the contrast between American wealth and Arab poverty is now being broadcast daily into people's tiny homes. The world's very poorest people, preoccupied with survival, do not even realize the extent of their relative deprivation.

(57) Part of the success of many Islamist groups, especially well-established groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, is due to their understanding of the recruitment potential of social services. These groups painstakingly built up their support by attending to the social needs of their potential recruits far more effectively than governments did. They established hospitals, schools, and orphanages.

(58) It is not enough to provide education if you do not provide the means to employ those you have educated.
61) A great many terrorist groups have controlled their behavior and the extent of the casualties they have been prepared to inflict out of a desire not to alienate their core constituency... Religious groups are different. If one's audience is God, then one does not need to worry about alienating him.

(65) Yet he [Reagan] too withdrew in the face of attack. This exploded the myth for many in the Middle east that there was any essential difference between Democrats and Republicans in the United states. Both were paper tigers. To this day, Osama bin Laden repeatedly invokes the American withdrawal from Lebanon after the attack on the Marines as evidence of American cowardice and unwillingness to fight.
NB: Reagan killed us. He was the first US President to stick his tail between his legs and run away from terrorists. We should not let the Republicans forget it, as they have. (76-80) Secondary Motives - exacting revenge, generating publicity, achieving specific concessions, causing disorder, provoking repression Reinforcing organizational dynamics - making a show of strength
All of these secondary or more immediate motives can be subsumed under three motivations: Revenge, Renown, Reaction.

(85) Bin Laden, for all his carefully choreographed statements and all the colorful descriptions of the iniquities of the West, has completely failed to articulate a positive political alternative. Like other revolutionaries before him, therefore, he appears to be more enamored of the revolution itself than of the new world it would herald... A striking and quite surprising aspect of most terrorist movements is now little of their attention is devoted to describing the new world they intend to create... Terrorist leaders today also appear altogether more interested in the process by which the present system will be destroyed than in the functioning of the new system... But if one does not have a coherent vision of the future, then one's means are more likely to be determined not by the needs of the society one is trying to create but rather by the iniquities of the society one is trying to destroy.

(93) The larger the number of casualties, the more innovative the tactic, the greater the symbolic significance of the target, the more heinous the crime, the more publicity accrues to the perpetrators.

(98) Terrorists, no matter what their ultimate objectives, invariably are action-oriented people operating in an action-oriented in-group. It is through action that they communicate to the world. This phenomenon has been called "propaganda by deed." Action demonstrates their existence and their strength. In taking action, therefore, they want to elicit a reaction.

(100) So long as there is a reaction, therefore, the terrorist purpose is served... In an effort to try to ensure the safety of their citizens and to demonstrate their competence, governments invariably react strongly, and often forcibly. Moreover, if governments do not act, not only do they jeopardize their won political survival, but they run the risk that terrorists will feel compelled to commit ever-larger atrocities in order to elicit a reaction.

(101) Part of the genius of terrorism, therefore, is that it elicits a reaction that furthers the interests of the terrorists more often than their victims.

(105) From 1981 to 1999, suicide attacks took place in seven countries, Since 2000, they have taken place in about twenty.

(106) Suicide terrorism is unsettling to us because it does not quite fit the popular image of terrorists as self-serving evildoers. In willingly taking their own lives, terrorists are staking a claim to moral superiority that is quite incompatible with our notion of their moral depravity... Suicide terrorism has been growing in popularity precisely because it has proven to be an effective means of exacting revenge, attaining renown, and eliciting a reaction. As with terrorists generally, the necessary components for suicide operations are a disaffected individual, a supportive and enabling community, and a legitimizing ideology.

(106-107) every known martyrdom operation, a group plays an essential role in planning the terrorist attack and in training, sustaining, and supervising the volunteer. The average martyrdom operation requires a support cast of about ten others. Societies the world over reserve their highest honors for those who have given their lives for their country. Public squares everywhere are filled with monuments to those who have been victorious in battle. Suicide terrorists seek honors like these, and their handlers make sure that they get them.

(107) The most frequently cited precursors to contemporary suicide terrorists are the Jewish Sicarii in the first century and the Islamic Assassins in medieval times. Both showed complete disregard for their own lives, and the Assassins in particular had a culture of martyrdom reminiscent of the culture one finds today in the Gaza Strip.

(113) The idea of suicide terrorism traveled from Iran to Lebanon, but from Lebanon it spread a long way. A number of Tamil insurgents received training in Lebanon in the early and mid-1980s and took the tactic back to Sri Lanka. Moreover, the Israeli decision to deport 415 Palestinian militants to Lebanon in 1992 had disastrous unintended consequences as the Palestinians learned the value of the tactic from Hezbollah. In this way the skill set was transferred from Shiite (Iran and Hezbollah) to Sunni (Hama and later al-Qaeda) Muslims, as well as to secular Palestinian and Tamil groups. The modern phenomenon of suicide terrorism, therefore, can be traced to teh Lebanese Civil war of 1973-1986.

(117) A PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] spokesman made the same point: "We do not take depressed people. If there were a on-in-a-thousand chance that a person was suicidal, we would not allow him to martyr himself. In order to be a martyr bomber you have to want to live."
NB: Choosing death makes a life authentic
(118) There have been more suicide attacks in Iraq alone in the years since the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 than in the rest of the world since the tactic was first adopted in 1981. In May and June 2005, there were more suicide attacks in Iraq than had been recorded by the Israleis since the tactic was first used in Israel in 1993.

(125) The most expensive suicide operation in history was the 9/11 attacks, and they cost an estimated $500,000 while inflicting tens of billions of dollars in damage, quite aside from the enormous human costs.

(126) "What the rank and file [of Hamas] seemed to live and die for, in the end, was neither hospitals nor politics nor ideology nor religion nor the Apocalypse, but rather an ecstatic camaraderie in the face of death on the path to Allah." _The Road to Martyr's Square- by Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg
NB: Small group loyalty is always what keeps an army going. You fight for your buddies not the flag not your country.
(141) One of the most striking things that changed on that day [9/11], therefore, was that for the first time terrorists had succeeded in killing very large numbers of people, the kind of casualties that had previously occurred only in interstate or civil warfare. Historically, terrorists have not taken the opportunities available to them to murder on a grand scale. They have not needed to. They could further their objectives and inflict widespread terror without inflicting widespread casualties. The most frequently cited aphorism making this point was made by the RAND analyst Brian Jenkins in 1974: "Terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead."

(143) We are not very familiar with the writings of Frantz Fanon, who wrote of violence as liberating, as necessary to the perpetrator as a means of freeing himself from oppression. This is not the instrumental violence of the robber or Mafia member. This is expressive violence to cleanse the soul.

(163) Padilla has been held as an enemy combatant, the only American citizen arrested in this country to be so classified. two years after his arrest, the Justice Departmenjt revealed that in fact he had not been planning to deploy a dirty bomb but instead to blow up some apartment buildings. The plan had apparently been a modest one that involved Padilla and an accomplice renting two apartments. They then planned to turn on the natural gas and set off conventional explosive devices simultaneously in both buildings. As an enemy combatant, Padilla has not yet been brought to trial. In the minds of most Americans, however, he has been incarcerated for planning a dirty bomb attack on this country... Bin Laden has long understood the essential role of terrorism as communication.

(167) It is not quite true, therefore, that, in the words of President Bush, "September 11 changed our world.' Rather it was our reaction to September 11 that changed the world. Americans suffered a terrorist attack unprecedented in its scale and destructiveness and in so doing lost their sense of security and their sense of perspective. The fear engendered by the attack was out of proportion to the threat we faced. We believed that we now faced a powerful enemy driven by irrational religious fanaticism and determined to use weapons of mass destruction against us. In fact, our enemy was much less powerful than we thought, demonstrated a persistent capacity for rational behavior, and had concrete political as well as religious motivations, and its interest in weapons of mass destruction was driven more by a desire to intimidate us and defend itself against us than by the desire to deploy them in the United States.

(170) When the history of the immediate post-9/11 years comes to be written, it will be seen as a period marked by two major mistakes and two major missed opportunities. The mistakes were a declaration of war against terrorism and the conflation of the threat from al-Qaeda with the threat from Saddam Hussein. The missed opportunities were the opportunities to educate the American public to the realities of terrorism and to the costs of our sole superpower status and the opportunity to mobilize the international community behind us in a transnational campaign against transnational terrorists.

(172) The phrase "war on terrorism" had also been fairly widely used much earlier by the press to describe the efforts by Russian, European, and eventually American governments to stop assassination attempts by international anarchists in the late nineteenth century.

(173) [response to 9/11] An undersecretary of defense later explained that the United States had been "so busy developing its war plans that it did not have time to focus on coordinating Europe's military role." A year after the attack, NATO held a summit meeting in Prague. Lord George Robertson, the secretary-general of NATO and former British defense secretary, had very high hopes for the meeting. The plans for the summit envisioned the adoption of a comprehensive package of measures to combat terrorism and even the creation of a NATO Response Force, a technologically advanced, flexible, and interoperable force that would be available for immediate deployment following a decision by the NATO Council. Robertson hoped that NATO would become the focal point of the international fight against terrorism and demonstrate that NATO had changed to adapt to the new security environment.

(177) The ultimate goal of any war must be to deny the adversary what it is that he wants. Terrorists want to be considered at war with us, so to concede this to them is to grant them what they want, instead of doing our utmost to deny them what they want.

(184) The tactics of the Argentinean, Brazilian, and Chilean military governments, however, are simply not available to democratic governments. Those governments eradicated insurgent terrorism but in so doing replaced it with what was in effect state terrorism, the wanton abuse of force. No government could practice such tactics and remain a democracy, since the rule of law is replaced by the rule of force.

(185) On the basis of its extensive experience, the British military devised what were known as the Thompson Principles, six principles of counterinsurgency warfare. These are: 1. The primacy of the political 2. Coordination of government machinery 3. Obtaining intelligence 4. Separating the insurgent from his base of support 5. Neutralizing the insurgent 6. Postinsurgency planning

(197) By using the extreme language of conviction that bin Laden uses, by declaring war, even a crusade, against him in response to his war against us, we are mirroring his actions. We are playing into his hands, we are elevating his stature, we are permitting him to set the terms of our interactions. Given that he has a very weak hand and we have a very strong one, we should not be letting him set the parameters of the game.

(198) There is no greater affront to terrorists than to be ignored. They deliberately attempt spectacular attacks in an effort to gain attention. The risk of ignoring a terrorist action, of course, is the fear that it might incite the terrorists to carry out even more devastating attacks in order to get attention. So ignoring terrorist is not a feasible option, especially in a democracy, in which the public demands action in the face to atrocity. By pursuing terrorists like the criminals they are, however, outside the limelight and with painstaking and necessarily covert action, one can undermine their effectiveness without raising their profiles.
(203) Six Rules for Counteracting Terrorism
Rule 1: Have a defensible and achievable goal

(204) Due to the impact of our response to 9/11 on al-Qaeda, and in particular the fact that the movement now has many of the characteristics of a diffuse and inspirational ideology rather than a military organization, even if we were to capture the remainder of those responsible we would not have defeated terrorism. As a result, our task today is in many ways more difficult than it was in fall 2001. Rather than having the objective of the defeat of terrorism, today our goal should be to contain the threat from terrorists.

(206) Rule 2: Live by your principles

(208) Rule 3: Know your enemy Our post-9/11 counterterrorist campaign has actually been fairly successful in this regard.
NB: Despite the best efforts of the neocons to shout this idea down in the public square.
(213) The costs of wars are such that participants feel they need to continue fighting to justify the costs already borne. wars and terrorist campaigns tend to be prolonged by an unlikely alliance of hawks on both sides and generally require an alliance of doves on both sides in order to make peace.

(215) Rule 4: Separate the terrorists from their communities

(218) If al-Qaeda believes that its greatest strength is the popular support it enjoys among the Muslim populations, our energies should be focused on undermining that support. On the contrary, almost everything we have done has served to strengthen that support.

(223) By its humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering caused by the tsunami in Indonesia, the United States has undermined popular for terrorism against the United States.

(224) Rule 5: Engage others in countering terrorists with you

(227) Today we are in the curious position in which behind-the-scenes cooperation is actually better than anyone cares to admit publicly. The unpopularity of the U.S.-led war on terrorism is such that allied governments have no desire to publicize the degree to which they are helping us, preferring instead for the cooperation to take place quietly. Small groups of French and German special forces, for example, are in Afghanistan and Pakistan searching for the remnants of the al-Qaeda leadership but without announcing this fact for fear of domestic unpopularity. It cannot be in our interest for our allies to conceal the extent to which they are helping us.

(231) Rule 6: Have patience and keep your perspective

(232) The language of warfare connotes action and immediate results. We need to replace this language with the language of development and construction and the patience that goes along with it.

(235) The situation of opium production, however, is a good deal worse. Afghanistan had 82,000 hectares of land cultivating poppy in 2000, when the Taliban banned opium production. The ban was a near-complete success, and the amount of land under poppy cultivation dropped to 7,600 hectares in 2001. In 2004, there were 131,000 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Eighty-seven percent of the world's opium production now takes place in Afghanistan, up from 12 percent at the time of the U.S. invasion.

(237) The most recent attacks in London, Madrid, and the Netherlands all suggest that the Muslim diaspora in Europe will produce the next wave of terrorist attacks.
_Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning Without War_ by Philip Heymann Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003

Saturday, January 23, 2016

The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier

_The Pathan Unarmed:  Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier_ by Mukulika Banerjee
Santa Fe, NM:  School of American Research Press, 2000

(44)  This left the remaining districts of Mardan and Peshawar to bear the bulk of the increased taxes;  in the 1930s these were to be the central strongholds of Khudai Khidmatgar support.

(56)  More specifically, Badshah Khan had come to the conclusion that their activities so far had not "bred a sufficient sense of self-sacrifice" that was needed for a fully committed nationalist struggle.  Reflecting on the experiences of his earlier life, he felt that the solution to both his current political problem of promoting a unified nationalist struggle in the Frontier and his ongoing practical concerns about improving education and living standards lay in the cultivation of a greater sense of _service_ in Pathan society....

By early 1930, the KK strength was around 1,000 volunteers.

(60)  Having been little more than 1,000 at the start of 1930, KK membership was estimated at some 25,000 by the end of 1931....
NB:  Kissa Khasai massacre at Utmanzai

His approach was quite different, therefore, from the sudden call to arms of a charismatic leader.  As Sarfaraz Mazim said:  "Badshah Khan first told the people the facts of British rule and explained the situation to them.  Then he led them.  It was not the other way around.  He did not expect them to follow automatically."

(61)  Noor Akbar recalled that:  "Again and again Badshah Khan told us that the British could be removed without any violence if the Pathans could only unite."

(62)  "We did not know before that the British were ruling us.  The mullahs and khans were in the pay of the British so they never told people the truth.  No one in the whole Frontier had the spirit or the guts to speak against the British other than Badshah Khan."

(63)  "It was some time before 1930.  I heard Badshah Khan talk about reform in our mosque.  He said that in order to get rid of those [the British] who were in land that was not theirs, we first had to reform our ways.  He said that he needed volunteers to help him in this task.  He said that he had nothing to offer, no salary or money. What he wanted was not very many people;  but at least one man who would be honest and willing to serve the people.  Therefore I joined the movement by vowing my allegiance to Badshah Khan."

(68)  The motivation for joining the KK movement, therefore, was not a single, articulated, nationalist zeal but rather reflected a mixture of views and responses to social pressures. This variety, however, was very much a strength, since it meant that there were a number of criteria by which the movement could benchmark its own progress and success.  In this respect it differed significantly from the earlier violent movements in the Frontier, which were of a more millenarian character.  Premised on a single grand aim of salvation from the British infidel and the establishment of a religious utopia, such uprisings could not fulfill these magical promises and their leaders found their support quickly dwindled away.  The varied social, political and material aims of the KKs, on the other hand, if more modest, were also far more likely to bring tangible and positive results.

(73)  The wider Red Shirt membership was far larger, however, and the Governor reported that over 50,000 "would call themselves Red Shirts" [by 1938]

(83)  With the intra-KK marriages, however, equality came to be demonstrated not through extravagant bride price, which Badshah Khan had long criticized, but rather through shared participation in the KK and the exchange of political camaraderie.
NB:  Opium as a way to earn the bride price in Afghanistan today

(86)  In its emphasis upon the combination of self-reform, grace and discipline, the KK had more in common with the Salvation Army than it did with the British Army. Like the Salvation Army, the KK was based on voluntary work and service, yet also prized virtues such as discipline and efficient organisational machinery.

(93)  A very important aspect of the civil disobedience movement was its boycott of institutions of the colonial state, notably the courts, police, army, tax offices, and officers, and schools.  Such non-cooperation was practised in a variety of ways.
NB:  Flag marches, picketing liquor and foreign clothing shops

(97)  As Mohammed PIr Sher Shah emphasized, "We did party work only one or two days of the week.  The rest of the time we had to work on our lands."  People recalled with gratitude the fact that when Badshah Khan went around villages and wanted to talk to farmers working in the fields, he used to make his escorts plough the land so that the farmers could sit and talk to him without losing valuable time.

(98)  Amazingly Grana had said to me:  "You will see in the British records that you are reading in England mention of a little boy who once stood up and addressed a meeting.  That was my son, Qasim Khan."  Deputing a little boy to read out the resolutions at a meeting was a standard solution to the problem of women otherwise having to keep purdah in front of Badshah Khan or another adult male speaker.  Badshah Khan's speech-by-proxy urged women to show solidarity with the nationalist struggle by wearing khadi and by assisting their men in the non-violent civil disobedience.  His emphasis on shari'a law was specifically related to his long-time support for proper women's inheritance rights, which the Quran prescribes but which Pathan tradition neglected.  Badshah Khan had also long argued the importance of educating women as part of ensuring a healthy society.

(100)  In his [Badshah Khan's] 1945 article, however, he put caution aside and made an unequivocal statement in favour of women's participation:  "We cannot stop people from spreading propaganda against us and that will continue for the next twenty years.  There is no point in waiting that long, for whenever we allow women to participate in our movement people will always talk." 

(122)  At this point in our rather tense dialogue, Sarfaraz Khan interjected:  "We did carry sticks and we hot-headed Pathans used to throw stones when we were pushed too hard, too far... especially the bereaved women of murdered KKs.  But we had tried to learn patience.  After all, even the Quran says that 'War should be one of Patience.'" 

(123)  Lieutenant Muhammad Wali remembered his ribs being broken by the police at a riot but "even then I did not resort to violence.  We removed the British by our patience. Non-violence gives a strength of mind."

(126)  Badshah Khan stated in his speeches that "it is unselfish public service, and not a red shirt, that makes a Khudai Khidmatgar."  As he often remarks in his autobiography, however, the only way of convincing Pathans of anything is by example, and so he travelled and lived among the rural population of the Frontier as one of them.  Mohammed Yakub Khan told me:

"Badshah Khan came to this area again and again to convince people of non-violence.  He lived by example... when he used to visit he was never a burden on anyone.  He was like a faqir, he carried his own food with him and he ate only dry bread...  people who went with him had to carry their own food too... usually just a little gur and channa [chickpeas and unrefined sugar].  He ate once a day.  If anyone offered him more than one course he declined it.

_Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, a Man to Match His Mountains_

_Nonviolent Soldier of Islam:  Badshah Khan, a Man to Match His Mountains_ by Eknath Easwaran
Tomales, CA:  Nilgiri Press, 1984/1999
ISBN 1-888314-01-x

(108)  For the poet Khushal Khan, as for all Pathans, autumn rather than spring brings renewal.  Then the sun dips south toward the Arabian sea, the air from the passes cools, wedges of geese float over from the Central Asian plateau, the poplars and willows turn amber - and Pathan blood stirs.

(145)  Gaffar Khan on why he never knew whether his brother's wife had accepted Islam or not:
...not one in a hundred thousand knows the true spirit of Islam.  I think at the back of our quarrels is the failure to recognize that all faiths contain enough inspiration for their adherents.  The Holy Koran says in so many words that God sends messengers for all nations and peoples.  All of them are Ahle Kitab -"Men of the Book" - and the Hindus are no less Ahle Kitab than Jews and Christians.

(146)  During his tour he saw the real significance of Gandhi's insistence on spinning.  Where villagers spun, they had enough to eat;  where they did not, they starved.

(171)  Ghani [Gaffar's son] asked Murtaza how nonviolence could have become the creed of a former outlaw.  The plainspoken reply offers an insight into the dynamics of satyagraha, soul force, which taps the hidden potential of the human spirit.  "I was a little saint for those four years [he was a commander of the Khudai Khidmatgars]," he told Ghani.  "I tried to live up to my dreams instead of my desires.  It was great, it was a miracle.  I refused fortunes for a hope and spared lovely girls because they trusted me and looked up to me."  In his unintended way, Murtaza reveals the infectious power of nonviolence - love in action.  "You cannot help loving those that love you," he told Ghani, "and you cannot hurt those that trust you.  I tried to live up to what the people thought I was."  Thus the grizzled outlaw went to prison again - but this time as a "servant of God" in the cause of his people's freedom.

(186)  Counting from 1910, with the opening of his first school in Utmanzai, Badshah Khan went on serving, reforming, and resisting tyranny for almost eighty years.  I cannot imagine finding anywhere in the world's history a life of more unbroken service in the cause of freedom.

Despite his thirty years in jail [held in both British and Pakistani prisons] - the equivalent of every third day of his life - Badshah Khan never ceased to stand by the principles of love and service with which he began his mission.  As one biographer wrote, "He will not bend."  Through all the suffering and setbacks, he remained a dedicated servant of God, compassionate, forgiving, and resilient - and as dogged as ever.

(194)  [after the Kaira action of 1918, why Gandhi recruited for the British military]  
This was not Gandhi's idea of nonviolence.  True nonviolence did not issue from weakness but from strength.  It was a matter of the powerful voluntarily withholding their power in a conflict, choosing to suffer for the sake of a principle rather than inflict suffering - even though they could.  Gandhi called this the "nonviolence of the strong," as opposed to the "nonviolence of the weak" that he had found in his Kaira peasants.  "My creed of nonviolence is an extremely active force," he insisted.  "It has no room for cowardice or even weakness."

(197)  Satya means truth in Sanskrit, and agraha comes from a Sanskrit root meaning "to hold on to," which Gandhi used as a synonym for "force."  Thus satyagraha carries a double meaning:  it signifies a determined holding on to, a _grappling_ with truth;  while at the same time it implies the forces that arises from that grappling, what Gandhi called"soul-force."  Satyagraha stands for both the means and the ends, the struggle and the force that is generated in that struggle.

As heat is generated by friction, Gandhi contended, power is released from within the depths of the human spirit in its struggle toward truth.  The raw material for this power is passion.  "I have learned through bitter experience," Gandhi explained, "the one supreme lesson to conserve my anger, and as heat conserved is transmuted into energy, even so our anger controlled can be transmuted into a power which can move the world."  In this "truth-struggling" nothing is lost or repressed;  energy is conserved and transmuted.  Thus in its transformative aspect nonviolence is not nonviolence at all, but violence transmuted, harnessed, _used_.  We could more properly call it _trans_violence, where the power of passions like anger, hatred, and fear is reshaped into a potent fighting force.

(263)  _My Life and Struggle_ by Abdul Ghaffar Khan
Delhi:  Hind Pocket Books, 1969

_Abdul Ghaffar Khan:  Faith Is a Battle_ by DG Tendulkar
Bombay:  Gandhi Peace Foundation (Popular Prakashan), 1967

_My Life and Struggle_ by Badshah Khan

_My Life and Struggle_ by Badshah Khan
Delhi, India:  Hind Pocket Books, 

(14)  He was Hafiz Koran, knew Koran by heart, by the time he was 8 and had madrassa schooling

(49)  A Hijrat Committee was formed in Peshawar and anyone who wanted to migrate to Afghanistan had to go through this committee, which provided him with all kinds of facilities and comforts.  In the beginning the Britsh tried to stop people from going on hijrat to Afghanistan, but later, when they found that people would not listen to them they changed their tune and encouraged people to go on hijrat in large numbers.

(61)  When he had gone I threw the pieces of gur out of the window and there and then I made a resolution that as long as I was in jail I would never do anything against the rules and regulations, because it created fear in a man's heart.  I had seen it happen to many of my political friends.  First they violate the rules, then they flatter the jailor.  They have to even bribe him.  All this is caused by fear and it costs a man his self-respect.  I did not want that to happen to me.

(86)  I replied:  "I have not come here to see relics, I have come here to look for the patience and courage of the Holy Prophet, who braved the journey through the desert from Mecca and came here for the welfare of the people of Taif.  And how did the people of Taif receive him?  They threw stones at him, set their dogs at him and beat him.  But in spite of all this cruelty the Prophet did not despair of the people, but he prayed for them saying:  'Oh God, be Thou their Guide and show them Thy ways.'"

(160)  I should mention here, that when the Jirga was discussing whether to start civil disobedience or not, Haji Faqir Khan of Hazara proposed that we should cut telephone wires, or remove railway sleepers.  I told the Jirga that this would be allowed only on the condition that the saboteur himself went to the police and told them what he had done.  This would make him develop moral courage and this would be an inspiration to other workers.  Also, no innocent people would come under suspicion and the police would have no excuse for hunting and harrassment.  So this mass movement was started, according to my instructions and carried out with great discipline on the part of the workers.

(174)  After all we did not want to win the elections or form a ministry for the sake of ruling over people, but for the sake of serving them.

(195)  My religion is truth, love, and service to God and humanity.

(230)  The student said:  "Suppose the German [a visitor to Afghanistan] asks me why we do not have these sentiments of fellowship and brotherhood, what shall I say?"

I told him:  "The answer is that in other countries there are people who have sacrificed their own comfort and happiness, their lives and property for the sake of their country and people.  There are no such people in our country, and if by chance there are a few people like that somewhere, we call them infidels and Wahabis."

Ghaffar Khan: Nonviolent Badshah of the Pakhtuns

_Ghaffar Khan:  Nonviolent Badshah of the Pakhtuns_ by Rajmohan Gandhi
New Delhi:  Viking Penguin, 2004

(ix) Asfandyar Khan, eldest son of Badshah Khan's second son and a political activist

(38)  A mullah who had taught Ghaffar, when the boy was five or six, to recite the Qur'an could not explain its verses to Ghaffar because he himself did not know their meaning;  he knew, however, how to hit pupils.

(47)  Ghaffar Khan's sentiment for the Wigram brothers notwithstanding, he seems to have envisioned, as did the Haji of Turangzai, schools that would promote not only reform among the Pakhtuns - the ending of feuds and of wasteful expenditure on weddings and funerals - but also autonomy vis-a-vis the British.  These would be azad madrassas, independent Islamic schools.

(61)  To Ghaffar Khan he [Behram Khan] said, 'What the others are not doing, you should not do.  Sit comfortably at home.'  'If others stop offering namaaz', the son replied, 'would you want me to stop it too?' 'Of course not,' siad the father.  'Well, Father,' said Badshah Khan, 'My schools are like offering prayer.'

(84-85)  This commitment to nonviolence, which was new and significant in the public life of the Frontier province, did not however erase the facts that the KKs had emerged in direct consequence of the forceful crushing, led by Pakhtuns, of a non-Pakhtun attempt to seize the throne in Kabul.  In the words of a critical Pakistani admirer of Badshah Khan, 'a violent event in Kabul was celebrated in a nonviolent setting in Utmanzai, giving birth to a nonviolent movement.'

(86)  The 1930 salt defiance, which caught the world's imagination, was nowhere more resolute than in the Frontier.

(97)  The noticeable role of Pakhtun women in the 1930-31 movement (among the women addressing meetings were the sisters of the Khan brothers) was connected to that movement's nonviolence. 

(103)  The Khan brothers grew close also to the Bajaj family, hosts in Wardha to Gandhi and his guests, and to Mahadev Desai, Gandhi's secretary.  Desai drew the brothers out on their lives and soon produced, to the advantage of contemporaries and future researchers a valuable little book, _Two Servants of God_.

(120)  A remark made in Bannu revealed the relationship in Gandhi's mind between the spinning wheel and nonviolence.  'God whispered into my heart', said Gandhi, 'If you want to work through nonviolence, you have to proceed with small things.'  A week later, addressing Khudai Khidmatgars in the town of Tank in Dera Ismail Khan district, Gandhi offered an observation that would be quoted often in the future:

A small body of determined spirits fired by an unquenchable faith in their mission can alter the course of history.

(158)  Besides cash and guns, the British used Islam.  The Raj's records, including, for example, the diaries of George Cunningham, who occupied key positions in the Frontier, are frank about the paid employment of religious leaders from the Settled Districts for influencing the tribal chiefs, in the name of Islam, against Russia, Germany and supposedly 'Hindu' movements for Indian independence.

(173)  In March and April peace committees were formed by KKs (and in some cases by Ahrars and Khaksars) all over the province, mainly to protect non-Muslims. Charged with involvement in rioting, thousands of Leaguers were arrested. [1947]

(190)  Recalling this interview in 1965, Badshah Khan said that he told Jinnah that if three conditions were met the Pathans could happily join Pakistan.  One, the terms had to be honourable.  Two, the Pathans of the Settled Districts and the tribal areas should have the right to opt out of Pakistan if the latter, after independence, stayed as a British dominion. Three, all matters concerning tribal people should be settled by the Pathans without the interference or domination of non-Pathans.

(203)  Mercifully the Frontier was spared large-scale communal riots in August and September, thanks in part to the role the KKs played.  'Despite their desertion by the [All-India Congress], the Khudai Khidmatgars still held strength in the province and ... protected the lives and property of the non-Muslims in the NWFP.' [1947]

(206)  Jinnah asked Badshan Khan to join the Muslim League.  Ghaffar Khan said he found it hard to join a body whose members had only recently looted the properties of Hindus and Sikhs.  'Surely there were exceptions - some who did not loot', Jinnah said.  ' Yes,' Badshah Khan agreed, 'those who did not get an opportunity.'

(229)  In less than a year, however on 9 May 1958, Dr Khan Sahib was knifed to death in the house in Lahore of his eldest son, Sadullah Khan, an engineer working for the government.  The assassin, apparently a speaker of Punjabi or Seraiki, found Dr Khan Sahib in the veranda, stabbed him near the groin, and ran.  He was chased by the seventy-six-year old victim, by two Alsatians in the house, and by a driver, and was caught, but old Dr Khan Sahib, struck in a vital artery, bled to his death.   Although after a trial the assassin was hanged, his motive and possible links to any others were never clearly brought out.

(240)  We may note here that a Pakhto song written by Ghani Khan, 'Ay zama watana ('O homeland mine), would become Afghanistan's national anthem.

(242)  The Prophet said, belief in God [means] to love one's own fellowmen...  My people are drowning before my eyes and to save them I shall grasp any helping hand, be it the hand of a Hind or an infidel.

I was called Hindu by those who used to pick crumbs from British tables.  [from Badshah Khan's Pakhtunistan Day speeches, 1965 - 1967]

(247)  On 24 November, addressing a joint session of both houses of Parliament, Ghaffar Khan was franker still:  'Your revenue is from taxes and duties on liquor.  You are forgetting Gandhi the way you forgot the Buddha.'

(248)  To India's Muslims, he recommended non-retaliation, in the name of the Qur'an:  'If you plant a slap after having been provoked by a slap, then what is the difference between the followers of the Qur'an and the evildoer?'

(251)  A gory struggle ensued and an independent Bangladesh emerged in 1971-72.  Yahya Khan resigned, Bhutto became the ruler of a truncated Pakistan, and the National Awami Party founded by Badshah Khan and led since 1967 by his son Wali Khan won a share of power in the NWFP and Balochistan.  Taizi claims that some tribal jirgahs called on Badshah Khan in Kabul, to fight for an independent Pakhtunistan if supplied with arms.  According to Taizi, neither Badshah Khan nor Zahir Shah encouraged them.

(252)  Earlier, Bhutto had crafted constitutional changes that made Islam Pakistan's state religion and stipulated that only a Muslim could be the nation's president or prime minister.

(254)  Badshah Khan saw through Zia's Islamism, which was far more glaring than that of Bhutto (who was hanged in 1979).  'Bandookwale namaazi ho gaye hain,' Ghaffar Khan noted:  'The men with guns have become the prayer experts.'

(257)  Afraid that Badshah Khan might die in Kabul, thereby giving the mujahedin a propaganda weapon, Karmal pressed India to accept the old man for treatment.  Indira was willing to oblige Karmal, but 'the highly pragmatic' Badshah Khan named his price:  a meeting with Brezhnev.  To Dixit [Indian ambassador to Kabul] he said:  'Send this message to Indira, and tell her I will only come if she gets me to meet Brezhnev.' [1982]

(258)  'That nation is great which rests its head upon death as a pillow.'  So Gandhi had written, way back in 1909, in _Hind Swaraj_.

(261)  In the summer of 1983, when he was in Pakistan, statements that he and Wali Khan made seemed to link the Soviet entry into Afghanistan to the facilities in the NWFP and Balochistan that Zia's Pakistan was giving to the USA.  Father and son and many other opposition leaders were arrested.  A house of the irrigation department in Khesghi, about eleven miles from Muhammad Naray, was turned into a sub-jail, and the ninety-three-year-old Badshah Khan was detained in it.

(268)  Writing seven years before Badshah Khan's death, the Swedish scholar Jansson identified four 'messages' from his life:  intense Pakhtun nationalism, moral and social reform, nonviolence, and Islam.

(272-273)  His Islam seemed to be of the most natural kind.  When, on his end-1934 arrest in Wardha, which occurred within days of a rare family reunion, he told Jamnalal Bajaj, 'What pleases God pleases me', and left smilingly with his captors, he gave expression to Islam's fundamental tenet of submission to God's will.  If acceptance of God's will is a matter of the heart rather than of the lips, then Badshah Khan's inner obedience over a long and hard lifetime makes him a true and exemplary Muslim.

We saw also that he was a courageous Muslim, unafraid to believe his own honest interpretation of scripture, and unafraid to question voices from Muslim platforms that he felt were using religion for politics or commerce.  Such voices criticized him several times during his long life, including when he and his older brother Jabbar went to Rev Wigram's school, when he started  his own schools, when, alongside Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians, he joined the fight for India's freedom, when he and his brother sent their children to the West for education, when he opposed India's division along religious lines, when he defended Hindus and Sikhs in the Frontier province, when he visited India in 1969-70, and when he opposed the Zia regime in Pakistan...

Again and again he insisted that the Prophet's chief demand of a Muslim was the service of fellow human beings.

(274)  His prison-going and political campaigns limited Ghaffar Khan's exertions for women's empowerment, but his honesty before the Frontier's women - 'Today we are the followers of custom and we oppress you' - was exceptional.

(275)  Noting that Ghaffar Khan 'practised Islam and nonviolence and showed that it was not only for the weak', [Mubarak] Awad started a network called Nonviolence International to promote social change and international peace....

Harold Gould, the American scholar... Ghaffar Khan's life has  a role in the 'radical rethinking by radical Islamists'....

(276)  In 1946, alluding to the potential for fanaticism in the Frontier region, he warned that 'a dangerous situation is fast developing in the tribal areas', and a year later he said, 'I feel it is my duty to warn you against future dangers so that I may justify myself before man and God on the Day of Judgment.'  This was a quintessentially Muslim thought from one whose directness invited charges of apostasy from those made uncomfortable by it.

The naturalness of his Islam, his directness, his rejection of violence and revenge, and his readiness to cooperate with non-Muslims add up to a valuable legacy for our angry times. This legacy may be of help to Muslims and non-Muslims today in the task of overcoming divides between Islam and the West  (and modernity), between Afghanistan and the subcontinent, between Islam and the subcontinent's Hindus, Sikhs and other non-Muslims.  His bridge-building life is a refutation of the clash-of-civilization theory.

But he was also a rock.  No force or threat could shake his stand for Pakhtun dignity, which at bottom was a stand for the freedom and dignity of every human being. The Pakhtuns between the Hindu Kush and the Indus were his first love but also his links to humankind, and we can, if we wish, hear him, even if we are west of that mountain range or east of that river.

(280)  Abdul Ghani Khan, _The Pathans:  a Sketch_  (Islamabad:  Pushto Adabi Society, 1990, p 45)

(283)  Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, "Ghani Khan",

(285)  Erland Jansson _India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?:  The Nationalist mOvements in the NWFP, 1937-47_  (Uppsala, Sweden:  University of Uppsala, 1981)

(286)  _Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism:  Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-47_  Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah (Pakistan:  Oxford Unviersity Press, 1999, p 92)

(287)  Abdul Wali Khan _ Facts Are Sacred_  (Peshawar:  Jaun Publishers, 1991, p 88)

(293)  Pyarelal, _Thrown to the Wolves:  Abdul Ghaffar_  (Calcutta:  Eastlight Book House, 1966, p 133

P S Ramu _Badshah Khan_ (Delhi:  SS Publishers, 1991, p 98-99)

Haribhau Joshi _Badshah Khan_  (Varanasi:  Nagari Prcharini Sabha, 1970)

(297)  Joan V Bondurant _Conquest of Violence:  The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict_  (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1958)

(299)  G L Puri _Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan:  A true Servant of Humanity_ (New Delhi:  Congress Centenary Celebrations Committee, 1985)

(300)  Sher Zaman Taizi _Bacha Khan in Afghanistan:  A Memoir_, June 2002

Mohammed Yunus _Frontier Speaks _ (Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1947)